Rethinking EU governance: from ‘old’ to ‘new’ approaches to who steers integration* by Schmidt, Vivien A.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Global Studies BU Open Access Articles
2018-11
Rethinking EU governance: from
‘old’ to ‘new’ approaches to who
steers integration*
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Accepted manuscript
Citation (published version): Vivien A Schmidt. 2018. "Rethinking EU Governance: From ‘Old’ to
‘New’ Approaches to Who Steers Integration*." JCMS: Journal of
Common Market Studies, Volume 56, Issue 7, pp. 1544 - 1561.
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12783
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/39036
Boston University
Published in the symposium issue: “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics” eds. 
Mareike Kleine and Mark Pollack, Journal of Common Market Studies (2018) vol 57, no. 7 
(2018):  1544-1561	https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12783	 
 
 
 
Rethinking EU Governance:    
 
From ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Approaches to who Steers Integration 
 
 
Vivien A. Schmidt 
Boston University 					
Abstract: 
EU scholars have long divided on the main drivers of European integration.  The original 
approaches were at odds on whether EU level intergovernmental actors or supranational 
actors were better able to exercise coercive or institutional power to pursue their interests, 
with Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism serving as a baseline for one side of 
those debates.  Newer approaches are similarly divided, but see power in terms of ideational 
innovation and consensus-focused deliberation. The one thing old and new approaches have 
in common is that they ignore the parliamentarists, new and old. What all sides to the debates 
have failed to recognize is the reality of a ‘new’ EU governance of more politically charged 
dynamics among all three main EU actors exercising different kinds of power.  This has 
sources not only in the national level’s increasing ‘politics against policy’ and its bottom up 
effects on the EU level. It also stems from EU institutional interactions at the top, and its 
‘policy with politics’.   
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Rethinking EU Governance:    
 
From ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Approaches to who Steers Integration 
 
Introduction 
 
Scholarly debates about ‘who drives European integration?’ or, more simply, ‘who is in 
charge?’ have changed significantly since the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, when 
Andrew Moravcsik (1993; 1998) wrote his seminal works on liberal intergovernmentalism.  
At the time, his approach challenged the long-standing realist ‘intergovernmentalist’ view of 
European integration, exemplified in the work of Stanley Hoffmann (1966), that saw the 
member-states in charge of integration, exercising their bargaining power in the Council to 
protect their national interests while building Europe.  With liberal intergovernmentalism, 
Moravcsik sought to account for why member-states deepened integration even when it 
appeared to go against their national interests. He did so by reaffirming that the member-
states were in charge, imposing their preferences through intergovernmental bargaining in the 
Council, but argued that domestic socio-economic interests rather than geopolitical interests 
were the main drivers of member-states’ preference formation.  This baseline liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach to integration also served as a counter to the rising 
‘supranationalist’ view, which had itself displaced the earlier neo-functionalist approach 
focused on ‘spillover’ effects (e.g., Haas 1958).  Supranationalists maintained against the 
intergovernmentalists, both liberal and realist, that integration moved forward because EU 
officials were in control, exercising institutional power through their mastery of the EU 
policy process (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998).   
 
These now traditional debates continue to this day, pitting the intergovernmentalists—who 
insist that the member-states pursuing the national interest and/or domestic socio-economic 
interests are in charge—against the supranationalists—who maintain instead that EU 
supranational actors drive integration via institutional dynamics of spillover and 
entrepreneurialism.  But while this divide continues, it has been joined by self-styled ‘new’ 
protagonists who build on while challenging both sides of the traditional debates.  These 
debates pit the ‘new’ intergovernmentalists— who insist that the more actively engaged, 
consensus-seeking member-state governments in the (European) Council have retaken 
control (e.g., Bickerton et al., 2015; Puetter 2012)—versus the ‘new’ supranationalists— who 
continue to view EU level supranational actors such as the Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as driving integration through their greater role in policy design and 
enforcement (e.g., Bauer and Becker 2014; Epstein and Rhodes 2016).  The one view shared 
by both sides is that of the declining significance of the European Parliament and the co-
decision mode of policy-making. For another set of analysts, whom we shall call the ‘new’ 
parliamentarists, the views of old and new intergovernmentalists and supranationalists are 
mistaken, because they fail to recognize the new formal and informal ways in which the EP 
has regained influence (e.g., Hix and Hoyland 2013; Héritier et al., 2016). 
 
The main focus of this article is on the ‘new’ ways in which scholars now explain 
contemporary EU governance—including ‘new’ intergovernmentalism, ‘new’ 
supranationalism, and ‘new’ parliamentarism—and how these contrast with one another as 
well as with the older approaches. The paper will show that whatever the substantive 
differences among the proponents of different aspects of the newer approaches to EU 
governance, they share a common framework of analysis.  Almost all emphasize the 
importance of sentient actors’ ideas and discursive interactions following a constructivist or 
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discursive institutionalist logic, in which actors’ ideational powers are constructed through 
discourse and deliberation.  But the paper will also demonstrate that although they for the 
most part share a common analytic framework, the ‘new’ EU governance approaches differ 
in how they theorize the exercise of such power in EU governance.  New 
intergovernmentalists argue that member-state actors are in charge of EU governance, with 
outcomes a result of their powers of persuasion in intergovernmental deliberation.  New 
supranationalists contend instead that supranational actors are in control of EU governance, 
with outcomes a result of their powers of ideational innovation and institutional discretion.  
And new parliamentarists, more modestly, insist that parliamentary actors are gaining 
influence, with outcomes increasingly a result of their ideas and discursive interactions with 
the other more institutionally powerful actors.  
 
But whatever the differences among such ‘new’ approaches, they are united in their 
opposition to the older approaches to EU governance with regard to both their rationalist or 
historical institutionalist frameworks of analysis and their theorizations of the exercise of 
power. The traditional intergovernmentalists, theorizing within a rationalist framework, argue 
that the outcomes of member-states’ rationally driven, interest-based negotiations are 
determined by their asymmetrical bargaining power, or what we will henceforth term, for 
purposes of conformity with the literature, ‘coercive’ power (defined as relations of control 
by one actor over another, where these relations allow one actor to shape directly the 
circumstances or actions of another—Dahl 1957; Barnett and Duvall 2005: 43, 49; see also 
Carstensen and Schmidt 2016, 2017).  The traditional supranationalists, theorizing within a 
historical institutionalist framework, contend that the outcomes of supranational actors’ rules-
grounded, interest-based institution building are determined by their institutional power.  And 
the traditional parliamentarists, theorizing within either a rationalist or historical 
institutionalist framework, insist that the outcomes of the parliamentary actors’ pursuit of 
greater influence are enhanced by their exercise of (very weak) coercive or institutional 
power. 
 
In short, while new and old theorists of EU governance may be united by a shared focus on a 
preferred EU actor, whether the Council, the Commission, or the EP, they are divided in their 
views of the nature of the power exercised by their preferred actor, whether rational 
institutionalist, historical institutionalist, and/or discursive institutionalist and  constructivist  
(see Table 1).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Although applauding the newer approaches for their innovations in EU integration theory, in 
particular their focus on EU actors’ ideational and discursive powers, this article contends 
that it is a mistake to largely disregard the significance of coercive or institutional power, 
emphasized in the older approaches.  The article suggests instead that it is more useful to 
leave open the question of which kind of power is being exercised by which actor in order to 
establish through empirical analysis which kind of power or combination of powers is in play. 
 
But the main thrust of the article is a critique of all such approaches for their emphasis on one 
or another EU institutional actor alone.  Its purpose is to demonstrate the real complexity of 
EU governance, which involves a ‘new’ political dynamics of interaction affected by the 
politicization of both national and EU levels 
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The benefit of these debates, old and new, is that the different sides lend major insights into 
the changing powers and responsibilities of ‘their’ EU actors vis-à-vis the other EU actors.  
The drawback is that they are naturally more focused on demonstrating the significance of a 
given EU institutional actor than in shedding light on the overall picture.  What they miss by 
assessing the institutional powers, positions, ideas, and actions of any given EU actor on its 
own is how all such EU actors have become more dynamically interactive in EU level 
governance.  Equally importantly, they miss the national level dynamics, as elucidated by 
post-functionalists (e.g., Hooghe and Marks 2009), which suggests that increasing national 
politicization in response to EU encroachments on national government and democracy has 
not only disrupted mainstream politics, with the rise of populist challenges.  It has also had 
significant feedback effects on EU policymaking, making for more politically charged EU 
governance.  This suggests that Moravcsik’s (1993) original insight about the influence of 
domestic interests on EU level decision-making remains key to understanding EU 
governance today and in the future.  But that insight must be expanded to include not just 
socio-economic interests but political interests more generally, meaning how national 
electoral politics and citizen discontent affect EU level decision-making. 
 
Politicization is not just bottom up, however, from the national to the EU level, affecting 
member-state positions in the Council alone.  It is intra-institutional at the top, among EU 
actors in their on-going interactions.  Politicization has affected all EU actors’ actions and 
interactions, making for a ‘new’ dynamics of EU governance that is more political in every 
way.  With this in mind, Schmidt’s (2006) characterization of the EU level as consisting of 
‘policy without politics,’ based on the tendency to apolitical and/or technocratic decision-
making, no longer fully describes EU governance, which has increasingly become ‘policy 
with politics’ in the more contentious areas.  At the same time, what Schmidt (2006) 
identified as national level ‘politics without policy has only worsened, so much so that it 
arguably no longer fully describes the current situation, which has increasingly become 
‘politics against policy’ or even ‘politics against polity.’ 
 
New Intergovernmentalism 
 
Scholars who explain EU governance as characterized by the ‘new intergovernmentalism’ 
see the EU’s member-state leaders in the European Council as much more legislatively active 
than in the past.  They find that the member-states have taken on an unprecedented leadership 
role that they exercise through consensus-seeking deliberation rather than the exercise of 
coercive power through interest-based bargaining (Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; 
Fabbrini 2016). This involves much more shared authority and joint control at the EU level 
than was considered possible in the older approaches to intergovernmentalism, whether in the 
original ‘realist’ view—in which member-states’ bargaining focused on protecting national 
sovereignty and interests (Hoffman 1966)—or the revisionist ‘liberal’ view—in which 
member-states’ hard bargaining and brinkmanship served as a conduit for domestic socio-
economic interests (Moravcsik 1993; see also Schimmelfennig 2015a). 
 
Moreover, unlike some of the traditional intergovernmentalists, whether realist or liberal 
intergovermentalist, who tended to theorize the Commission as delegated ‘agents’ which the 
Council ‘principals’ could control, the new intergovernmentalists present the Council as 
actively seeking to reduce Commission powers through the creation of supranational 
agencies.  Thus, they argue that member-state governments, rather than delegating new 
powers for the Commission in view of new tasks, instead deliberately created de novo EU 
bodies and instruments outside the main EU institutions in efforts to maintain control.  Such 
	 5	
efforts involved not only keeping the Commission out of those bodies but also putting the 
member-states qua member-states in, for instance by ensuring their representation on the 
governing boards.   Examples of such de novo bodies include the European Central Bank 
(ECB) (Hodson 2015); new financial entities such as the temporary European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the permanent European Stability Mechanism (ESM); new 
administrative bodies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS); and a new 
President for the European Council.  
 
In conjunction with this argument, the new intergovernmentalists at the same time contend 
that member-states’ new activism sidelines the older supranationalism, which sees 
bureaucratic entrepreneurialism and institutional creep as having increasingly institutionally 
empowered the traditional supranational actors in the European Commission and the 
European Court of Justice (CJEU) (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Moreover, rather than 
assuming that the Commission is intent on pushing ‘ever closer union’, as suggested by the 
old supranationalists, they see it as much more circumspect in its ambitions, focused on core 
goals, and more interested in better accomplishing its main tasks (Peterson 2015; see also 
Hodson 2015).  
 
For the new intergovernmentalists, finally, the mistake of the older intergovernmentalists has 
been to assume that the process is all about the pursuit of power, whether coercive power 
through interest-based bargaining in the Council or institutional power through budget 
maximizing for the bureaucracy. Instead, new intergovernmentalists maintain that the 
decision-making process in the Council since the Maastricht Treaty of the early 1990s needs 
to be understood in terms of the exercise of ideational power, with member-states seeking to 
arrive at consensual agreements through deliberation (see discussion in Carstensen and 
Schmidt 2017).  In the Council in particular, they highlight the deliberative processes of 
negotiation that lead to agreements resulting from persuasion rather than power politics 
(Puetter 2012).  
  
Thus, for example, new intergovernmentalists would reject out of hand the analysis by liberal 
intergovernmentalists of the Eurozone crisis response of 2010 to 2012.  The liberal 
intergovernmentalists see that response in terms of coercive power, as a game of chicken in 
which the strong preference to avoid the break down of the euro area was combined with 
efforts to shift the costs to the weaker euro members most in trouble (Schimmelfennig 2015a).  
Instead, new intergovernmentalists focus on ideational power, mainly in terms of the 
consensus-based agreements forged in the Council.  After all, each and every member-state 
bought into the story of excessive public debt and failure to follow the rules, pledged 
themselves to austerity, and agreed repeatedly to reinforce the rules of the SGP in exchange 
for loan bailouts or bailout mechanisms (Fabbrini 2013; see also Schmidt 2015).   
 
But if we accept the new intergovernmentalist argument that the Council acts as a consensus-
seeking deliberative body, because member-state leaders did all first agree to the restrictive 
rules and after to the successive reinterpretations, we at the very least need to recognize that 
this was not a deliberation among equals.  In any of the deliberations—or, better, 
contestations—going back to the beginning of the crisis, Germany held outsize power to 
pursue its own interests (Schimmelfennig 2015a).  That power was institutional, as German 
opposition to doing anything delayed any decision on Greece until the markets threatened the 
very existence of the euro; it was ideational, given German insistence on the reinforcement of 
the ordo-liberal rules of the Stability and Growth Pact; and it was coercive, resulting from 
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Germany’s political veto position in any agreement as a result of its economic weight as the 
strongest economy in Europe (Carstensen and Schmidt 2017).  
 
Although this exercise of multiple kinds of power—coercive, institutional, and ideational—
was not akin to a ‘dictatorship’ by Germany (as some Southern Europeans might insist), 
since deliberation continued and a consensus was achieved on reinforcing ‘governing by 
rules and numbers’ in exchange for loan bailout mechanisms, the best we can say is that the 
Council was a deliberative political body acting in the shadow of Germany (Schmidt 2015, p. 
107).   Notably, Fabbrini (2016) is the only new intergovernmentalist who takes account of 
power and interest, arguing that Council governance has moved from consensus-seeking to 
hierarchical domination, first by Germany with France, then by Germany alone.  
 
Moreover, the question remains as to how we should characterize the discursive battles 
waged publicly by member-state leaders of Italy and France to shift the interpretation of the 
‘stability’ rules to growth (in 2012) and then to greater flexibility (in 2014). Remember that 
Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti in late 2011 started calling for growth, which was then 
taken up by François Hollande as French presidential candidate in 2012, while Italian Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi beginning in 2014 pushed for increased flexibility in the interpretation 
of the stability rules, supported by President Hollande.  These public communicative 
discourses were directed not only to the citizens but also to other EU leaders, and were 
accompanied by internal coordinative discourses that constituted political struggles over the 
rules-following agenda.  The result was a change in member-state leaders’ discourse in 2012, 
by adding ‘growth’ to stability.  As for flexibility, German Chancellor Merkel agreed to it in 
2014 on condition that it remained ‘within the stability rules.’ But her Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble continued to complain that the Commission was overstepping its 
authority in granting derogations (as the Commission implemented Council commitments to 
growth and then flexibility).  So would we characterize these interactions as new 
intergovernmentalist processes of deliberative consensus-seeking?  Or could they be seen as 
traditional intergovernmentalist processes of bargaining, where the most powerful wins (as in 
Schimmelfennig’s 2015b critique of new intergovernmentalism)?  Or some of each? The 
question is not just theoretical, it is empirical, depending upon whether interactions are 
mostly hard processes of bargaining or softer processes of persuasion. 
.   
A major problem for the new intergovernmentalist approach in general, then, is that it has 
done little to theorize power in the context of constructivist deliberation.  The very use of the 
terms deliberation and consensus-seeking seems to imply that member-states do not engage 
in the power relations and bargaining posited by the older intergovernmentalists, whether 
realist or liberal intergovernmentalist.  But without considering coercive power in the 
processes of deliberation or, better, contestation, we can’t explain why Germany’s 
preferences won out, especially initially (Schimmelfennig 2015a, 2015b).  That said, by only 
positing coercive power and rationalist bargaining (as per the older intergovernmentalism), 
we can’t explain why Germany conceded, over and over again, to things it had initially 
resisted, including agreeing to new institutional instruments of Euro governance such as the 
ESM and banking union, and new guidelines for Euro governance such as growth and 
flexibility, pushed by France and Italy (Schmidt 2015; Carstensen and Schmidt 2017).  
 
New Supranationalism  
 
Other scholars take a different view of the new developments in EU governance.  They point 
to the emergence of a ‘new’ supranationalism in which the older supranationalism of 
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institutional power and leadership by the technical actors in the Commission has indeed 
diminished, much as the new intergovernmentalists argue. But in exchange, these new 
supranationalists contend—against the new intergovernmentalists—that the Council enabled 
all supranational technical actors—whether the Commission, the European Central Bank, or 
other de novo bodies—to gain even greater institutional powers of enforcement than in the 
past, and this through the very rules passed by the more active (new) intergovernmental 
political leaders.  Moreover, in an ironic twist, according to the new supranationalists, these 
selfsame technical actors have, through the exercise of ideational power, developed and 
proposed to the intergovernmental political leaders the policy initiatives they themselves then 
enforce.   
 
Thus, in contrast to the older supranationalism, which emphasizes the Commission’s use of 
institutional rules and dynamics to push deeper European integration along with self-
empowerment and interest (Niemann and Ioannou 2015), the ‘new’ supranationalism focuses 
on the Commission’s ideas and institutional entrepreneurship to make European integration 
work better, whether or not this serves its specific power and interests (Bauer and Becker 
2014; Dehousse 2016; Epstein and Rhodes 2016).  Notably, even new intergovernmentalists 
acknowledge that the Commission has adjusted to the new realities by taking a pragmatic 
view of the new European agencies, in particular because they were established in areas 
where the Commission’s own powers were previously weak and served to enhance its 
objectives and/or provided an additional means of rule-making, information and enforcement 
(Peterson 2015).  
 
In the Eurozone crisis, for example, the new supranationalists have argued that the European 
Commission is ‘the unexpected winner of the crisis’ (Bauer and Becker (2014) and that 
supranational actors more generally—in particular the ECB as well as the Commission—
have ‘availed themselves of the discretionary powers with which they were formally or 
informally vested to adopt decisions that did not reflect the policy preferences of all national 
governments, notably those of Germany’ (Dehousse 2016). The European Semester, which 
was long prepared by the Commission in tandem with think tanks and expert consultants, has 
given the Commission unprecedented oversight authority and enforcement powers with 
regard to member-state governments’ budgets  (Bauer and Becker 2014; Schmidt 2015).  
Similarly, the Banking Union, spurred by the ideas of the ECB in consultation with experts 
and in deliberation with the member-states in the Council, has given it unprecedented 
supervisory authority and resolution powers over member-state banks (Dehousse 2016; 
Rhodes and Epstein 2016). 
 
Along with this greater authority and responsibility, according to the new supranationalists, 
has come an unprecedented institutional power and autonomy of action (especially the ECB) 
and discretion in applying the rules (in particular the Commission).  The ECB’s autonomy is 
apparent in the Eurozone crisis, as it progressively reinterpreted its mandate, going from a 
narrow view focused on inflation fighting and insisting that it could not be a lender of last 
resort (LOLR) to doing almost everything that a LOLR does.  This started with ‘non-standard’ 
and then ‘unorthodox’ policies of buying member-state debt (despite the prohibition in the 
treaties) by doing it on the secondary markets, and going all the way through to quantitative 
easing in 2015 (Braun 2013). Similarly, in the European Semester, the Commission has 
exercised increasing flexibility in its interpretation of the rules over time, whether through 
derogations of the rules for individual member-states (e.g., France and Italy have twice been 
given extended time to bring their deficits under the target numbers) or recalibrating the 
calculations (e.g., for Spain on its structural deficit in 2013) (Schmidt 2016). 
	 8	
 
But why, we might ask, have the new intergovernmentalists overlooked or underplayed the 
rise of the new supranationalism?  This may be because the ‘new’ supranational actors have 
often sought to dissimulate their newly enhanced powers and authority.  In many cases they 
have exercised their new autonomy and discretionary authority ‘by stealth,’ that is, by 
reinterpreting the rules while not admitting it in their communications with the public or in 
their coordination with political leaders (Schmidt 2015, 2016). 
 
For example, while the ECB has radically reinterpreted its mandate over time, it has sought 
to hide that reinterpretation ‘in plain view’ for fear of possible legal challenges and member-
state complaints as well as to ensure its legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry (Schmidt 2016). 
The ECB claimed over and over again that it was staying strictly within its mandate even as it 
moved from a narrow interpretation focused on maintaining its credibility to fight inflation 
and denying that it could be a lender of last resort to an increasingly loose interpretation, 
justifying this with a discourse focusing on ensuring stability in the medium term (Drudi et al. 
2012). This enabled it to defend its decision to do ‘whatever it takes’ (in Draghi’s famous 
words in July 2012) via Open Monetary Transactions if needed, and ultimately to become a 
lender of last resolrt in almost all but the name through quantitative easing.  
 
In contrast with the ECB, the Commission remained between ‘a rock and a hard place’ in the 
context of the Euro crisis, and its discourse reflected this, as it sought to hide its increasingly 
flexible reinterpretation of the rules with a harsh public discourse of austerity and structural 
reform (Schmidt 2016). The Commission found itself sandwiched between the leaders of 
countries seeking greater flexibility, non-program as well as program countries under Troika 
surveillance—and member-state leaders in the Council insisting on applying the rules 
strictly—the Germans most prominently, but also the Finns and Dutch, who kept close tabs 
on the Commission, and held it to task in Eurogroup meetings on the European Semester.   
 
New supranationalists, then, like the new intergovernmentalists and unlike the old 
supranationalists, are also mainly focused on the ideational innovation and discursive 
interaction in order to explain how technical actors were able to prevail even against the 
wishes of powerful Council political leaders.  But here too, it would be useful to consider 
how the different kinds of power played a role in the consensus-seeking behavior.  The old 
supranationalists’ emphasis on institutional power helps us explain why supranational actors 
were able to act even without approval from the alleged ‘principals,’ who held what old 
(realist) intergovernmentalists at least would see as a monopoly on coercive power. Such 
institutional power could be seen to have enabled supranational agents to ‘save the euro’ in 
the case of the ECB, or to reinterpret the rules more flexibly, if only ‘by stealth,’ in the case 
of the Commission.  Ideational power, however, exercised through a persuasive discourse, is 
also necessary to help to explain how, despite the seemingly coercive power of Germany in 
the Council, the ECB was able to radically reinterpret its mandate ‘in plain view’ and the 
Commission to push through derogations to the rules for member-states in trouble even while 
insisting that it was applying harsh austerity and structural reform (Schmidt 2016; Carstensen 
and Schmidt 2017).  
 
 ‘New’ Parliamentarism 
 
The one substantive view that the intergovernmentalists and supranationalists, old and new, 
have in common is that they largely ignore the role of the European Parliament, and see the 
co-decision process as the great loser in the shift to the new EU governance.  But rather than 
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focusing on the question of whether co-decision is no longer the sine qua non of processes of 
deeper integration, and thus the basis of EP power, we would do better to consider what may 
be afoot.  In addition to older approaches to parliamentarism, in which the EP is seen to seek 
greater influence through its role in the co-decision process, a ‘new’ parliamentarism 
theorizes EP empowerment through ideas and discursive persuasion outside the traditional 
circuits of influence.  And even if such ‘new’ parliamentarism remains no match for the ‘new’ 
intergovernmentalism or the ‘new’ supranationalism, it nevertheless needs to be taken into 
account, in particular because it demonstrates that the EP’s relative influence has increased 
significantly in ‘new’ ways as well as old since the Maastricht Treaty (Hix and Hoyland 
2013; Fasone 2014; Dinan 2015; Héritier et al. 2016—see also Hix, this issue).  Although the 
EP continues to have little coercive power in comparison to intergovernmental or 
supranational actors, it has wielded increasing institutional power, if only informally, by 
tactically using its legislative competences, as well as ideational power, in particular by 
becoming the ‘go-to’ body for legitimacy. 
 
There can be no doubt that the co-decision process of decision-making has been supplanted 
to some extent by the increase in intergovernmental and supranational policymaking in recent 
years, in particular in the Eurozone crisis—as new (and old)  intergovernmentalists have 
argued.  They even see the tacit collaboration of the EP in undermining co-decision, for 
example, by abandoning it so long as they increased their own importance via a more 
privileged role in inter-institutional negotiation (Reh et al., 2011; Bickerton et al., 2015).  But 
even as this speaks to the weakening of co-decision, it provides evidence for ‘new’ 
parliamentarism, through the strengthening of the EP in new ways through negotiation with 
intergovernmental political actors through it increasing influence in ‘trilogues’ (Roederer-
Rynning and Greenwood, 2015).    
 
What is more, the co-decision process has also been regaining importance in conjunction 
with the ‘new’ supranationalism.  Not only has the Lisbon Treaty specified new powers of 
oversight for the EP in areas such as economic governance in which it was previously absent 
(Fasone 2014; Héritier et al. 2016) but even the new competences approved by 
intergovernmental actors for both existing and de novo supranational actors led them to 
generate new legislation requiring EP approval through the co-decision process—including in 
the Eurozone crisis in the cases of the Six Pack and the Two Pack, as well as in Banking 
Union (Fasone 2014; Crum 2015).  Informally, moreover, the EP can influence the 
Commission through credible threats of veto if it is not informed of the process as well as by 
blocking or delaying tactics (formulated in ‘old’ parliamentarist terms)—as when the EP 
blocked the Commission and the ECB on the Single Supervisory Mechanism until the ECB 
conceded rights of information to the EP (Héritier et al. 2016).   
 
More generally, while the EP’s actions may in some cases seem like a grab for more 
institutional power, they can equally be explained in terms of EP’s commitment to the idea 
that intergovernmental initiatives should be converted wherever possible into the more 
‘constitutional’ approach represented by the co-decision process (as in ‘new’ parliamentarist 
analysis).  This helps explain why the EP was in many instances willing to trade substantive 
policy goals for the institutionalization of a more co-decisional process, as in the case of EP 
(often failed) amendments to the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack as well as its (failed) efforts to 
influence the Fiscal Compact (Héritier et al. 2016, p 69). 
 
But even where the EP is completely left out of the decision-making process, it can still play 
a role, having increasingly become the ‘go-to’ body for other EU actors concerned about 
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their political legitimacy (Héritier et al. 2016). In the case of the ECB, for example, although 
the ECB President does not have to follow the EP’s advice in his mandated four yearly 
appearances, he gains in procedural legitimacy by speaking to the EP—plus he can use this 
venue as part of his communicative strategy with the public more generally.  It is in this light 
that we can understand Draghi’s (November 12, 2015) introductory remarks to the EP 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs: “The ECB’s accountability to you, the 
European Parliament, is a central counterpart to the ECB’s independence. And transparency 
is a precondition for your holding us to account’ 
 
More generally, we also need to take note of the EP’s growing exercise of voice, with 
increasingly noisy demands for accountability from both supranational and 
intergovernmental actors, that mostly take the form of hearings, expert testimony, and 
committee reports.  In the Eurozone crisis, these have explicitly criticized Council and 
Commission actions, whether for the Troika’s “lack of appropriate scrutiny and democratic 
accountability as a whole” or for the Eurogroup’s “failing to shoulder their share of 
responsibility in their capacity as final decision-taker” (Euractiv, March 14, 2014). 
 
Finally, equally important has been the EP’s self-empowerment through the ‘Spitzenkandidat’ 
in the 2014 EP elections, as the EP effectively anointed the leader of the winning political 
party Commission President (Dinan 2015).  This could be conceived as having increased the 
EP’s own powers at the expense of European Council autonomy, but also in favor of 
Commission autonomy through its now double accountability to the EP and the Council.  The 
fact that the Commission has been calling itself ‘political’—although not ‘politicized,’ in 
response to Council accusations of not applying the rules—suggests that the Commission is 
fully aware of the value of its connection to the EP, and may be seeking to rebuild its 
traditional supranational powers as it continues to develop its new supranationalism along 
with its political legitimacy.    
 
The ‘New’ Dynamics of EU Governance  
 
Part of the problem with taking one side or the other in these debates about ‘who leads 
European integration,’ meaning who is in charge or control, is not only that good arguments 
can be made for all sides.  It is also that it is very hard to choose a side because the actors 
themselves are in constant interaction, whether it is supranational actors persuading 
intergovernmental actors to take action, intergovernmental actors threatening supranational 
ones in order to constrain their action, or parliamentary actors pushing to play a role.  It is not 
just that the Commission or the ECB may supply the ideas that the Council then decides upon, 
which may result in greater enhancement of supranational actors’ ability to act autonomously 
or with discretionary authority.  It is also that the member-states—inside or outside the 
Council—may raise political objections or threaten legal action in order to constrain such 
supranational actors’ autonomous or discretionary action—whether they are long-standing or 
de novo actors. And supranational actors are therefore more political in considering how 
intergovernmental actors might respond to their initiatives, anticipating possible objections 
and/or consulting prior to action in order to gain preliminary agreement.  Moreover, both 
intergovernmental and supranational actors are increasingly aware of the EP, with its 
growing demands for attention on grounds of political legitimacy. 
 
Separating out the powers and responsibilities of supranational from intergovernmental or 
even parliamentary actors is thus more complicated than one might think.  Analytically, they 
can be dissected as distinct phenomena.  Empirically, they are thoroughly intertwined and 
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dynamically interactive. Moreover, in certain areas, it becomes very difficult to differentiate 
which is which, as in the area of Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), where 
decisions taken at the EU level through consensus-oriented deliberation are 
intergovernmental in the sense that they involve national representatives but supranational as 
they engage the member-states in ways that merge national security identity and action—
thereby making for supranational intergovernmentalism—or is it intergovernmental 
supranationalism (Howorth 2014, Ch. 2)? 
 
But if we are indeed finding it increasingly difficult to sort out who is more in charge or in 
control, we might do better to ask what are the dynamics of interaction in EU governance, 
using whichever approaches—old as much as new—help accounts for what it is we are 
seeking to explain.  This would means considering the ways in which the different actors 
exert power, whether as a result of their coercive or ideational dominance (Germany in 
particular), their institutional position or ideational and discursive influence (the Commission 
or ECB), or their ideational and discursive, institutional, or even coercive influence (the EP).  
We would also need to ask what power means in terms of politics, that is, which interests, 
institutions, and/or ideas are being empowered, and to what end.  And finally, we would want 
to ask about the political implications for democracy and legitimacy in the EU. 
 
Politics and the ‘New’ Dynamics of EU Governance  
 
Politics in the EU has become increasingly multi-level.  There is a politics that exists purely 
at the national level, as a reaction to the impact of EU integration on national democracy 
(among other things), which puts pressure on national party politics through the increase in 
citizen dissatisfaction and the rise of anti-system parties.   There is a politics that moves from 
the bottom up, through the nationally influenced politicization of EU relations, in particular 
in the Council.   And there is also a politics that exists solely at the top, with the increasing 
politicization of the interactions of EU institutional actors. 
 
In the EU today, even as all EU level institutions have been strengthened through the new 
dynamics of governance, national-level government has weakened in terms of democracy and 
legitimacy (see Hix, this issue).   The democratic deficit, in other words, has intensified, 
rather than remained as part of any ‘stable institutional equilibrium’ of a EU constitutional 
settlement (Moravcsik 2002), leading at best to an unstable settlement (Nicolaïdis, this issue).  
As decision-making in policy area after policy area has moved up to the EU level, European 
integration has increasingly encroached on issues at the very heart of national sovereignty 
and identity, including money, borders, and security. The problem, however, is not just that 
EU policies have encroached on national ones, but also that citizens have had little say over 
these matters, let alone engaged in EU-wide political debates about the policies.  And they 
are not happy about it, in particular in contested areas such as the euro an immigration policy.  
The result is what ‘post-functionalists’—who focus mainly on national level politicization 
around EU-related issues and the new cross-cutting cleavages in the electorate—have 
described as the shift from the ‘permissive consensus’ of the early years to the ‘constraining 
dissensus’ of today (Hooghe and Marks 2009; see also Kriesi et al. 2008; Hix, this issue). 
 
Citizens have increasingly made their displeasure heard through protests in the street and the 
ballot box, leading to the rise of the populist extremes, with Euroskeptic and anti-EU 
messages, and the increasing turnover of sitting governments.  National governments ruled 
by mainstream parties, moreover, have found themselves caught more and more between 
wanting to be responsive to citizens’ electoral expectations and needing to take responsibility 
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for the EU’s collectively-made rules and decisions (Mair 2013). In consequence, national 
governments confront dual challenges: from populism at the national level and from 
technocracy at the EU level (Caramani 2017).   
 
As a result, the national level can no longer be described only as ‘politics without policy’, 
because of the increasing removal of policy decisions from the national to the EU level 
(Schmidt 2006).  Today, it has also come to be characterized by ‘politics against policy’ in 
domains that are the focus of populist anger—such as the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, 
and immigration policy—or even ‘politics against polity,’ where the dissatisfaction turns into 
anger against the EU as a whole, as in the case of Brexit.    
 
At the same time, the EU level can no longer be described solely as ‘policy without politics,’ 
following from the seemingly apolitical (because geopolitical or socio-economic interest-
based) decisions in the Council and the technocratic processes in the Commission and other 
supranational bodies (Schmidt 2006).  This is not only because increasing national level 
politicization has put greater pressure on EU level actors.  It is also because of the struggles 
for power among EU institutional actors—whether understood as coercive, institutional, or 
ideational—that are inherently political in nature.  Taken together, this multi-level 
politicization helps explain the EU’s new political dynamics of interaction, which makes for 
EU level ‘policy with politics.’  
 
This also suggests that Moravcsik’s (1993) insight about the influence of domestic socio-
economic interests as expressed mainly by business organizations and associations on EU 
level decision-making remains important but requires updating to fully account for the 
current era.  Today, citizens’ political interests also matter greatly, with a significant impact 
on EU actors, a point also made by some contemporary liberal intergovernmentalists 
(Schimmelfennig 2015a; Tsebelis 2016).  In the Eurozone crisis, for example, although 
German and French governments sought to satisfy domestic economic interests by 
transferring the full costs to countries in the periphery in order to spare their own banks 
haircuts, they were also very concerned about citizen attitudes.  Merkel in particular played to 
the media feeding frenzy about ‘lazy Greeks’ versus ‘we Germans who save’ in the run-up to 
the Greek bailout, and delayed taking any action because of concerns over electoral 
repercussions in regional elections in May 2010 (Schmidt 2015).  Such delays went directly 
against her own ‘rational’ interests and those of business, which would have been better 
served by ensuring the member-states in the Council moved quickly to ‘save Greece,’ or 
allowed the ECB to act as a Lender of Last Resort for the country (Matthijs 2016). 
 
European integration theories generally have done little to address such issues of 
politicization, and have therefore missed how this has created a new politically charged 
dynamics of interaction not just among intergovernmental actors but among all EU level 
actors.  The politicization of Council negotiations and deliberations now arguably depends 
more on member-state leaders’ perceptions of domestic politics than on their (realist) beliefs 
about geopolitical interest or their (liberal intergovernmental) responses to domestic socio-
economic interests.  But in addition to such interest-based electoral concerns are political 
differences over ideas.  The Eurozone crisis, for example, generated a political battle of ideas 
between the German and Northern European proponents of austerity, fueled by ordo-liberal 
ideas of stability, and the more pragmatic French and Southern Europeans, supportive of neo-
Keynesian stimulus (e.g., Blyth 2013; Brunnemeier et al., 2016).   
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It should be noted that not all politicization of Council negotiations involves interest-based or 
ideational imposition, both of which risk delegitimizing the EU in the eyes of citizens. 
Informal accommodation in recognition of strong national interests and identity-based ideas 
has been a legitimizing force in the EU for a very long time. Making exceptions to the rules, 
or ‘informal governance,’ as Mareike Kleine (2013) explains, has been a normal part of 
processes of negotiated agreement in the Single Market, and has actually reinforced the 
legitimacy of the formal governance processes in cases where the political fallout from 
domestic groups’ objections could jeopardize consensual EU level politics or national 
political stability (Kleine 2013).   
 
But in the Eurozone crisis, the Commission’s making exceptions to the rules resulted in 
another kind of politicization of EU governance in its relations with the Council—in 
particular when the Commission President quipped, when asked about making exceptions to 
the rules for France in the European Semester exercise, that it is:  ‘Because it is France’ 
(Reuters, May 31, 2016).  This led to a firestorm of accusations by Northern European 
finance ministers in the Eurogroup that the Commission President was playing politics (Der 
Spiegel online, June 17, 2016).  The Commission response was that being a ‘political’ 
Commission meant paying more attention to citizen concerns, not playing politics.   
 
Finally, even the ECB could be seen to have become increasingly ‘political’ in the exercise of 
its mandate. ECB President Mario Draghi not only went to the EP to publicly legitimate ECB 
policy, as mentioned above, he also quietly cultivated his relations with political leaders in 
the Council, most notably Chancellor Merkel. For Banking Union in particular, Draghi 
engaged over the course of a year in a ‘charm offensive,’ seeking to persuade Merkel to agree 
to Banking Union even as he sought to isolate the Bundesbank (Spiegel 2014).  But in 
addition to such processes of persuasion on the ‘outside,’ the ECB president, much like the 
new intergovernmentalists suggest, also had to engage in a constant internal process of 
negotiation and consensus-seeking among the ECB board member representatives of the 
different member-states (Matthijus 2015). 
 
In short, EU supranational actors are increasingly aware of the political implications of their 
decisions, and therefore seek political, and not just technocratic, ways to shore up their own 
power and legitimacy not just with other EU level actors but also with the citizens.  Finally, 
as illustrated earlier, intergovernmental and supranational actors are also more politically 
sensitive to their interactions with the EP as they seek greater legitimacy, even as the EP 
seeks to reinforce its own influence by putting political pressure on other EU actors while 
attempting to forge stronger links with national parliaments and citizens. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the EU, no one account focused on any one institutional actor and decision-making 
process can explain EU governance.  What we are actually seeing is a growing empowerment 
of all EU institutional actors through an increasingly complex set of political interactions in 
which the ‘new’ dynamics of EU governance is about consensus-seeking deliberation as well 
as contestation, and in which power and interests remain important factors along with ideas.  
The one major problem with the differing ‘new’ approaches—as much as the ‘old’—is that 
they have failed to deal with the impact of EU governance on national democracies, as the 
locus of power and interest as well as the seat of consensus and deliberation has moved up to 
the EU level.   This has resulted in a politicization of the national level, in which national 
level ‘politics against policy’ or even ‘politics against polity’ has replaced the earlier 
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‘politics without policy.’ Such national politicization has in turn had feedback effects on all 
EU actors, leading to a new political dynamics of interaction among EU actors in which EU 
level ‘policy with politics’ has taken the place of the earlier ‘policy without politics.’  As a 
result, while ‘old’ and ‘new’ may explain a continuing ‘policy without politics’ in some of 
the less salient domains, they do not account for the ‘policy with politics’ that we now find in 
the most contested areas. 
 
So, twenty-five years on, what does the new political dynamics of EU governance mean for 
Andrew Moravcsik’s seminal work on liberal intergovernmentalism?  First, its original 
criticism of realist approaches, that domestic interests matter for intergovernmental actors, 
remains a powerful insight.  But it needs to be expanded from socio-economic interests to 
include political interests, with the recognition that EU policymaking is more influenced by 
domestic politics than ever before.  Second, its central focus on intergovernmental actors 
engaged in hard-bargaining power relations remains important, but not to the exclusion of 
ideational power and consensus-seeking deliberation. Finally, the exclusive view of 
intergovernmental actors as in charge, while not wrong, in particular in Treaty negotiations, 
makes for an incomplete understanding of EU governance.  It fails to account for the fact that 
supranational actors like the Commission, ECB, and other regulatory bodies exercise a great 
deal of control, especially in everyday practice and in areas in which they are autonomous; 
and that the European Parliament has increased its formal institutional and its informal 
ideational influence significantly.  
 
How then can we depict the consequences of the ‘new’ political dynamics of governance for 
the architecture of the EU?  Not as any move to some kind of ‘federal super-state’ in a multi-
level Europe.  Rather, the EU should be seen as an increasingly complex polity with a new 
political dynamics of interaction in which all EU actors have developed ‘new’ ways of 
wielding power and influence on top of the ‘old’ ones.  The challenge for EU scholars 
therefore is to assess the comparative usefulness of these different theoretical approaches to 
the explanation of EU governance, taking into account the fact that differences in underlying 
analytic frameworks may lead to a focus on different kinds of evidence with different 
theories focusing on different EU actors.  My own recommendation is for scholars to remain 
open to a pluralism of approaches, while ‘testing’ the validity of any and all such approaches 
against one another, by comparing and contrasting the results of their empirical analyses, to 
evaluate which approach or combination of approaches best serves to explain the theoretical 
issue and/or empirical problem in question.  
 
And how can we envision a combination of such approaches to EU governance?  The 
member-state governments continue to sit squashed all together in the driver’s seat of the 
double-decker bus, with one collective, consensus-bound foot on the gas pedal, regulating the 
speed, the other multi-ped foot ready to apply the brakes.  But the engine itself continues to 
run reasonably smoothly nonetheless—even if sub-optimally—as supranational EU actors 
pump the gas through the system even when the intergovernmental actors fail to press the 
pedal, and ensure that the brakes don’t lock even when the intergovernmental actors apply 
them indiscriminately.  Who is holding the steering wheel is the question.  Many hands, none 
of which has full control—although Germany may have the heaviest hand of all.   
 
So it is only with great effort, and agreement of all the actors, that the steering wheel can be 
turned in a new direction, say, onto a new highway.  This is why it is easier to reinforce the 
rules rather than invent new ones.  But there are shifts, as in the Eurozone’s reinterpretation 
of the rules ‘by stealth.’  However, these are generally incremental, with moves onto byways 
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rather than any sharp left or right turns, let alone U-turns, even when the rules don’t work.   
The main danger is that member-states’ citizens find themselves at the top deck of the bus, 
along for the ride but as far away as it is possible from the steering wheel, unsure who is in 
charge or in control, and increasingly unhappy about the direction.  With the rise of populism 
as a direct response, the question is what will happen if they come storming down the narrow 
stairs from the top of the double-decker, to harangue the many-headed conductor and 
possibly to wrest away control of the steering wheel.   
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Table 1:  Three Approaches to EU Governance, Old and New 
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